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Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
Je´roˆme Lang, Marija Slavkovik, and Srdjan Vesic
Abstract
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is inde-
pendence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should
not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in the same
agenda. Independence, although considered a desirable property, is too strong, be-
cause together with mild additional conditions it implies dictatorship. We propose
here a weakening of independence, named agenda separability: a judgment aggre-
gation rule satisfies it if, whenever the agenda is composed of several independent
sub-agendas, the resulting collective judgment sets can be computed separately for
each sub-agenda and then put together. We show that this property is discriminant,
in the sense that among judgment aggregation rules so far studied in the litera-
ture, some satisfy it and some do not. We briefly discuss the implications of agenda
separability on the computation of judgment aggregation rules.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation consists in finding collective judgments that are representative of a
collection of individual judgments on some logically interrelated issues. Judgment aggre-
gation problems originate in political theory and public choice, however they also occur in
various areas of artificial intelligence, as a consequence of the increased distributivity of
computing systems and social networks, together with the rise of artificial agency. Judg-
ment aggregation generalises voting and preference aggregation [8, 21], and has links with
belief revision [16, 30] as well as abstract argumentation [4, 1, 3, 2]. For an overview of
applications of judgment aggregation in artificial intelligence see for instance the work by
Grossi and Pigozzi [17] or Endriss [12].
The main focus of research in judgment aggregation is the development and analysis of
judgement aggregation operators. Numerous impossibility results – see the survey by List
and Puppe [23] for an overview – have dashed the hope of finding a universally applicable
operator. Consequently, the suitability of an operator for a given judgment aggregation
problem has to be identified with respect to the desirable properties that the aggregation
process should satisfy.
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is the inde-
pendence property, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on any one issue
in the agenda should not depend on the individual judgments given on any of the other
issues in the same agenda. Independence is a desirable property because, among other rea-
sons, it is a necessary condition for strategyproofness [10], and it leads to rules that are
both conceptually simple and easy to compute. However, independence is too strong; in
particular, together with mild additional conditions, it implies dictatorship [8].
We propose a natural weakening of independence, named agenda separability. A judg-
ment aggregation rule satisfies it if, whenever the agenda is composed of several independent
sub-agendas (with an extreme form of independence being when the sub-agendas are syn-
tactically unrelated to each other), the resulting collective judgment sets can be computed
separately for each sub-agenda and then put together. Resorting to syntactically indepen-
dent sub-languages is reminiscent of Parikh’s language splitting [28], where decomposing a
logical theory into several subtheories over disjoint sub-languages simplifies many tasks in
knowledge representation, such as belief change [29] or inconsistency handling [5].
The agenda separability property is very intuitive and motivations for it can be easily
found. For instance, in computational linguistics, we may want to aggregate annotations
from several agents about parts of texts [18]; then, finding collective annotations about parts
of two unrelated texts can (and should) be performed independently. When a rule satisfies
agenda separability, it also becomes computationally simpler when applied to decomposable
agendas, because the rule can be applied independently to every subagenda of the decom-
position. Agenda separability also offers a weak form of strategyproofness: no agent is able
to influence the outcome on some issue from one subagenda of the partition by strategically
reporting judgments about another subagenda.
Of course, a weakening of independence is meaningful only if there are rules that satisfy
it. Not only we show that this is the case, but we also show that agenda separability is
discriminant, in the sense that among the known judgment aggregation rules, some satisfy it
and some do not. This leads us to see agenda independence as a possible means of choosing
a judgment aggregation rule against another.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the background. Section 3
discusses the independence property. In Sections 4 and 5 we define two notions of agenda
separability, and we identify some rules that satisfy them and some that do not. Section 6
contains a summary and discussion.
2 Preliminaries
Let L be a set of well-formed propositional logical formulas, including ⊤ (tautology) and
⊥ (contradiction). An issue is a pair of formulas ϕ,¬ϕ where ϕ ∈ L and ϕ is neither
a tautology nor a contradiction. An agenda A is a finite set of issues and has the form
A = {ϕ1,¬ϕ1, . . . , ϕm,¬ϕm}. The preagenda [A] associated with A is [A] = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}.
A sub-agenda is a subset of issues from A. A sub-preagenda is a subset of [A]. An agenda
usually comes with an integrity constraint Γ, which is a consistent formula whose role
is to filter out inadmissible judgment sets. (A,Γ) is called a constrained agenda. As
a classical example, given a set of candidates C = {x1, . . . , xm}, the preference agenda
over C [8] is AC = {xiPxj |1 ≤ i < j ≤ m}, and the associated integrity constraint is
ΓC =
∧
i,j,k (xiPxj ∧ xjPxk → xiPxk). When Γ is not specified, by default it is equal to
⊤.
A judgment on ϕ ∈ [A] is one of ϕ or ¬ϕ. A judgment set J is a subset of A. J is
complete iff for each ϕ ∈ [A], either ϕ ∈ J or ¬ϕ ∈ J . A judgment set J (and in general,
a set of propositional formulas) is Γ-consistent if and only if J ∪ {Γ} 2 ⊥. Let JA,Γ be the
set of all complete and consistent judgment sets. To lighten the notations, we will generally
say that a judgment set is consistent instead of Γ-consistent, and note JA instead of JA,Γ.
A profile P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 ∈ J nA is a collection of complete and consistent individual
judgment sets. We further define N(P, ϕ) = |{i | ϕ ∈ Ji}| to be the number of all agents
in P whose judgment set includes ϕ. The order %P is the weak order over A defined by
ϕ %P φ if and only if N(P, ϕ) ≥ N(P, φ).
The restriction of P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 over a sub-agenda A1 of A is defined as P↓A1 =
〈J1 ∩ A1, . . . , Jn ∩A1〉.
Every consistent subset of the agenda S ⊂ A can be extended in order to obtain a
complete judgment set (there might be several such extensions). For a set S of subsets of
agenda , we define ext(S) = {J ∈ JA | there exists J ′ ∈ S such that J ′ ⊆ J}.
A judgment aggregation rule, for n agents, is a function R that maps any constrained
agenda (A,Γ) and any profile P ∈ J nA,Γ to a non-empty set of complete consistent judgment
sets over A.1 If R always outputs a singleton then it is called a resolute rule. The majori-
1The reason why the (constrained) agenda is an argument of rules is that the notions we study need a
tarian judgment set associated with profile P contains all elements of the agenda that are
supported by a majority of judgment sets in P : m(P ) = {ϕ ∈ A | N(P, ϕ) > n2 }. A profile
P is majority-consistent iff m(P ) is consistent.
Let S ⊆ L. We define Atoms(S) as the set of all propositional variables appearing in S.
For example, Atoms({p, q ∧ r,¬s→ ¬¬p}) = {p, q, r, s}.
Given a set of formulas S and a formula Γ, S′ ⊆ S is Γ-consistent if S′∪{Γ} is consistent,
S′ is a maximal Γ-consistent subset of S, if S′ is Γ-consistent and there is no S′′ ⊃ S′, S′′ ⊆ S
that is Γ-consistent. . We use max(S,⊆) to denote the maximal consistent subsets of S.
The set S′ ⊆ S is a maxcard Γ-consistent subset of S if S′ is Γ-consistent and there exists
no Γ-consistent set S′′ ⊆ S such that |S′| < |S′′|. We use max(S, |.|) to denote the maxcard
consistent subsets of S.
We now give the definitions of seven judgment aggregation rules. They come from various
places in the literature, where they sometimes appear with different names [20, 21, 26, 27,
24, 15].
Throughout the subsection, P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 is a profile. For two consistent and com-
plete judgment sets J, J ′ we denote their Hamming distance as dH(J, J
′) = |J \ J ′|.
mc,mcc. The maximum Condorcet rule (mc) and the maxcard Condorcet rule
(mcc) rules are defined as follows. For every agenda A, for every
profile P ∈ J nA, mc(P ) = {ext(S) | S ∈ max(m(P ),⊆)} and
mcc(P ) = {ext(S) | S ∈ max(m(P ), |.|)}.
ra. For A = {ψ1, . . . , ψ2m} and a permutation σ of {1, . . . , 2m}, let >σ be the linear order
on A defined by ψσ(1) >σ ... >σ ψσ(2m). We say that >σ is compatible with %P if
ψσ(1) %P ... %P ψσ(2m). The ranked agenda rule ra is defined as J ∈ ra(P ) if and
only if there exists a permutation σ such that >σ is compatible with %P and such
that J = Jσ is obtained by the following procedure:
• S := ∅;
• for j = 1, . . . , 2m do
• if S ∪ {ψσ(j)} is consistent, let S := S ∪ {ψσ(j)};
• Jσ := S.
RdH ,max(P ) = argmin
J∈JA
n
max
i=1
dH(Ji, J).
RS. A scoring function [7] is defined as s : JA × A → R
+. Given a scoring function s,
the judgment aggregation rule Rs is defined as RS(P ) = argmax
J∈JA
∑
Ji∈P
∑
ϕ∈J
s(Ji, ϕ). If
we choose the reversal scoring function srev(Ji, ϕ) as the minimal number of judgment
reversals needed in Ji in order to reject ϕ then we get the reversal scoring rule Rrev
[7]. If we choose the scoring function s defined by smed(Ji, ϕ) = 1 if ϕ ∈ Ji and 0 if
ϕ /∈ Ji then Rs is exactly the median rule, i.e. Rs ≡ med.
med(P ) =
argmax
J∈JA
∑
ϕ∈J
N(P, ϕ) = argmin
J∈JA
∑
Ji∈P
dH(Ji, J).
fullH. Given profiles P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 and Q = 〈J ′1, . . . , J
′
n〉 in J
n
A , let DH(P,Q) =
n∑
i=1
dH(Ji, J
′
i). fullH(P ) = {ext(m(Q)) | Q ∈ argmin
Q′∈Jn
A
DH(P,Q
′)}.
rule to be applied to a variable agenda. We omit writing A,Γ as an argument of R when defining R to
improve the readability of the text.
The rules defined here are irresolute, but similarly as in voting theory, can be made
resolute by composing them with a tie-breaking mechanism. A simple way of defining a tie-
breaking mechanism θ is via a priority relation >θ over consistent and complete judgment
sets. Given an irresolute rule R and a tie-breaking mechanism θ, the resolute rule Rθ is the
rule that, given P , returns the maximal (with respect to >θ) element of R(P ).
3 Relaxing Independence
A judgment aggregation rule F satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if for
every two profiles P, P ′ ∈ J nA , and every ϕ ∈ A, if P↓{ϕ,¬ϕ} = P
′
↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}, then ϕ ∈ F (P )
iff ϕ ∈ F (P ′). Independence is a very strong property: together with three seemingly
innocuous properties, namely universal domain (F is defined for every profile), unanimity
principle, and collective rationality (F outputs complete and consistent judgment sets), it
implies dictatorship [8].
In [25] a relaxation of IIA is proposed, called Independence of Irrelevant Propositional
Alternatives (IIPA). IIPA is the requirement that for every P, P ′ ∈ J nA , and every ϕ ∈ A
that is either an atom or a negation of an atom, if P↓{ϕ,¬ϕ} = P
′
↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}, then ϕ ∈ F (P ) iff
ϕ ∈ F (P ′). However [25] also shows that IIPA, modulo some conditions on the agenda, is
not consistent with the unanimity preservation requirement.
Now, while it is natural to expect that the individual judgments on logically related
issues will influence the choice of collective judgments for those issues, it is also natural
to expect that individual judgments over logically unrelated issues will have no impact on
them. To illustrate this point, we give an example from a collective decision making problem
that occurs in crowdcomputing.
There are a lot of tasks that are rather simple for a human to do, but fairly complicated
for a computer, such as labelling images, choosing the best out of several images, identi-
fying music segments etc. These types of tasks are called human intelligence tasks (hits).
Considering the task of cataloguing pictures by location, that is outsourced as hits to an
unspecified, but finite, group of people. The people undertaking these tasks should label
each photo in a series and also indicate reasons for their labelling. For example: the photo
is of Paris (p) if the Eiffel tower can be seen on it (e) or the Triumphal arc can be seen on it
(t); the photo is of Rome (r) if the Colosseum can be seen on it (c) or the Spanish Steps can
be seen on it (s). The commissioner of the hits will aggregate the individual labelings and
assign the labels that are collectively supported. The problem of finding which labelings are
collectively supported can be solved as a judgment aggregation problem; see the work by
Endriss and Ferna´ndez [14] for a similar view of crowdsourcing as a judgment aggregation
problem. Assume, for simplicity, that we have three labellers (or agents) and two pictures.
Furthermore, the commissioner is only interested in whether the first photo is of Paris and
whether the second one is of Rome. The problem for the first photo is represented with the
agenda [A1] = {p, e, t, e∨t→ p}, while the problem for the second photo is represented with
the agenda [A2] = {r, c, s, c∨s→ r}. Observe that Atoms(A1)∩Atoms(A2) = ∅. The agents
get the pictures at the same time. Clearly, whether the first picture is of Paris or not has
nothing to do with whether the second picture is of Rome or not, consequently we would
expect that the collective judgments regarding issues in A1 depend only on the judgments
given for these issues, but not on the individual judgments given for issues in A2.
In the next section we relax independence along this principle, defining a new property
called agenda separability.
4 Agenda Separability
Following the idea that only judgments on logically related issues should influence the col-
lective judgment on each issue, we define agenda separability as the property requiring that
when two agendas can be split into sub-agendas that are independent from each other,
the output judgment sets can be obtained by first applying the rule on each sub-agenda
separately and then taking the pairwise unions of judgment sets from the two resulting sets.
A partition {A1,A2} of A is an independent partition of A if for every J1 ∈ JA1 and
J2 ∈ JA2 , J
1 ∪ J2 is Γ-consistent.2
Definition 1 (Agenda separability) We say that rule R satisfies agenda separability
(as) if for every agenda A, every independent partition {A1,A2} of A, and all profiles
P ∈ J nA , we have
R(P ) = {J1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ R(P↓A1) and J
2 ∈ R(P↓A2)}.
If R is a resolute rule, then the last line of the definition simplifies into R(P ) = R(P↓A1 )∪
R(P↓A2).
Also, by associativity of ∪, this notion generalises to agendas that can be partitioned
into a collection {A1, . . . ,Ak} such that for every J1 ∈ JA1 , . . . , Jk ∈ JAk , J1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jk is
consistent. In that case,
R(P ) =
{
k⋃
i=1
J i
∣∣∣ J1 ∈ R(P↓A1 ), . . . , Jk ∈ R(P↓Ak)
}
.
IIA is defined for resolute rules only. We show that agenda separability restricted to resolute
rules is a weakening of IIA.
Proposition 1 Any resolute judgment aggregation rule that satisfies IIA is agenda separa-
ble.
Proof. If a resolute rule R satisfies IIA, we can write R(P ) =
⋃m
i=1 Fi(P↓{ϕi,¬ϕi})
where [A] = {ϕ1, . . . ϕm} and F1, . . . , Fm are resolute rules. Let {A1,A2} be an inde-
pendent partition of A. Without loss of generality, assume [A1] = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} and
[A2] = {ϕk+1, . . . , ϕm}. We have R(P ) =
⋃k
i=1 Fi(P↓{ϕi,¬ϕi}) ∪
⋃m
i=k+1 Fi(P↓{ϕi,¬ϕi}) =
R(P↓A1) ∪R(P↓A2). 
We shall see that the reverse implication does not hold.
Definition 2 The scoring function s is separable if for every A and every independent
partition {A1,A2} of A, for i ∈ {1, 2}, and every J ∈ JA and ϕ ∈ Ai, we have s(J, ϕ) =
s(J ∩Ai, ϕ).
We omit the easy proofs of the next two results.
Proposition 2 If s is a separable scoring function, then RS is agenda separable.
Corollary 1 med and Rrev are agenda separable.
2A stronger notion of independence, which makes sense only when Γ = ⊤, is syntactical agenda inde-
pendence: a partition {A1,A2} of A is syntactically independent if Atoms(A1) ∩ Atoms(A2) = ∅. Clearly,
syntactical agenda independence implies agenda independence, because Atoms(A1)∩ Atoms(A2) = ∅ implies
that A1 and A2 are independent. Note that the implication is strict: for example, let A = {x,¬x, x ↔
y,¬(x ↔ y)} = A1 ∪ A2, Γ = ⊤, A1 = {x,¬x} and A2 = {x ↔ y,¬(x ↔ y)}. {A1,A2} is an independent
partition of A although Atoms(A1) ∩ Atoms(A2) 6= ∅.
Proposition 3 mc, mcc, ra, and fullH are agenda separable. R
dH ,max is not agenda
separable.
Proof. For mc and ra, this will be a consequence of a stronger result proven in Section
5, therefore we give a proof only for mcc and fullH . Let {A1,A2} be an independent
partition of A.
mcc. Denote B1 = m(P1), B2 = m(P2) and B = m(P ). Let ΠP1,P2 = {J
1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈
mcc(P1) and J
2 ∈ mcc(P2)}. We first show that mcc(P ) ⊆ ΠP1,P2 . Let J∗ ∈ mcc(P );
thus J∗ ∈ ext(max(B, |.|)). Let J
1
∗ = J∗ ∩ A1 and J
2
∗ = J∗ ∩ A2. J
1
∗ and J
2
∗ are consistent,
because J∗ is consistent. Assume J
1
∗ /∈ ext(max(B1, |.|)). Since J
1
∗ is consistent, there exists
J1∗∗ ∈ ext(max(B1, |.|)) such that |J
1
∗∗| > |J
1
∗ |. Let J∗∗ = J
1
∗∗ ∪ J
2
∗ . Because {A1,A2} is
an independent partition of A, the consistency of J1∗∗ and of J
2
∗ implies the consistency
of J∗∗. But then |J∗∗| > |J∗|, which contradicts J∗ ∈ ext(max(B, |.|)). Therefore, J1∗ ∈
ext(max(B1, |.|)). Similarly, J2∗ ∈ ext(max(B2, |.|)). Thus, J∗ ∈ ΠP1,P2 .
Now we show that ΠP1,P2 ⊆ mcc(P ). Let J
1 ∈ mcc(P1) and J2 ∈ mcc(P2), that
is, J1 ∈ ext(max(B1, |.|)) and J2 ∈ ext(max(B2, |.|)). Let us show that J = J1 ∪ J2 ∈
ext(max(B, |.|)). Because {A1,A2} is an independent partition of A, J is consistent. Sup-
pose that there exists J∗ ∈ ext(max(B, |.|)) such that |J∗| > |J |. Let J1∗ = J∗ ∩ B1 and
J2∗ = J∗ ∩ B2. Both J
1
∗ and J
2
∗ are consistent, and |J∗| > |J | implies that |J
1
∗∗| > |J
1
∗ | or
|J2∗∗| > |J
2
∗ |, which contradicts J
1
∗ /∈ ext(max(B1, |.|)) and J
2
∗ /∈ ext(max(B2, |.|)). Thus, it
must be that J ∈ ext(max(B, |.|)) and, consequently, J ∈ mcc(P ).
fullH. Let X ⊆ J nA be the set of all profiles Q such that ext(m(Q)) ⊆ JA, CMC(P ) =
argminQ∈XDH(P,Q), and UA12 = {J
1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ fullH(P↓A1 ) and fullH(P↓A2)}.
We first show that fullH(P ) ⊆ UA12. Let J◦ ∈ fullH(P ). Let J1◦ = J◦ ∩ A1 and
J2◦ = J◦∩A2. Since J◦ ∈ fullH(P ) then there exists Q ∈ CMC(P ) such that J◦ ∈ ext(m(Q)).
Let us show that Q↓A1 ∈ CMC(P↓A1). Suppose that Q↓A1 /∈ CMC(P↓A1). Then, there
exists a majority-consistent Q∗1 ∈ J
n
A1
, Q∗1 = 〈I
∗
1 , . . . , I
∗
n〉 such that DH(Q
∗
1, P↓A1) <
DH(Q↓A1 , P↓A1). Let Q = 〈I1, . . . , In〉. Let Q↓A1 = 〈I
1
1 , . . . , I
1
n〉 and Q↓A2 = 〈I
2
1 , . . . , I
2
n〉.
Define Q∗ = 〈I∗1 ∪ I
2
1 , . . . , I
∗
n ∪ I
2
n〉. Because {A1,A2} is an independent partition of A,
Q∗ is a majority-consistent profile. Note also that DH(Q
∗, P ) < DH(Q,P ). Contradic-
tion. Thus, Q↓A1 ∈ CMC(P↓A1 ), and for the same reasons, Q↓A2 ∈ CMC(P↓A2). Therefore,
J1◦ ∈ fullH(P↓A1 ), J
2
◦ ∈ fullH(P↓A2 ), and fullH ⊆ UA12.
We now show that UA12 ⊆ fullH . Let J1◦ ∈ fullH(P↓A1) and J
2
◦ ∈ fullH(P↓A2). Thus,
there exist profiles Q1 ∈ CMC(P↓A1 ) and Q2 ∈ CMC(P↓A2) such that J
1
◦ ∈ ext(m(Q1)) and
J2◦ ∈ ext(m(Q2)). Let Q1 = 〈Q
1
1, . . . , Q
1
n〉, Q2 = 〈Q
2
1, . . . , Q
2
n〉, and Q = 〈Q
1
1 ∪Q
2
1, . . . , Q
1
n ∪
Q2n〉. Because {A1,A2} is an independent partition of A, Q is majority-consistent.
Let us show that Q ∈ CMC(P ). Assume that Q /∈ CMC(P ). Then there ex-
ists Q∗ ∈ CMC(P ) s.t. DH(Q∗, P ) < DH(Q,P ). Observe that DH(Q∗↓A1 , P ) +
DH(Q
∗
↓A2 , P ) < DH(Q↓A1 , P ) + DH(Q↓A2 , P ). This means that DH(Q
∗
↓A1 , P ) <
DH(Q↓A1 , P ) or DH(Q
∗
↓A2 , P ) < DH(Q↓A2 , P ). Recall that Q↓A1 = Q1 and Q↓A2 = Q2.
Thus, DH(Q
∗
↓A1 , P ) < DH(Q1, P ) or DH(Q
∗
↓A2 , P ) < DH(Q2, P ), which, together with
the fact that Q∗↓A1 and Q
∗
↓A2 are majority-consistent, contradicts Q1 ∈ CMC(P↓A1 ) and
Q2 ∈ CMC(P↓A2 ). Thus, Q ∈ CMC(P ). Note that J
1
◦ ∪ J
2
◦ ∈ m(Q). This implies that
J1◦ ∪ J
2
◦ ∈ fullH(P ).
RdH ,max. We provide a counter example.Let A = A1 ∪ A2 with [A1] = {p, q, p ∧ q}
and [A2] = {t}. Consider the profile P from Figure 1 with P1 = P↓A1 and P2 = P↓A2 .
We obtain RdH ,max(P ) = {{¬p, q,¬(p ∧ q), t}}. However RdH ,max(P2) = {{t}, {¬t}} and
R
dH ,max(P1) = {{¬p, q,¬(p ∧ q)}, {p, q, (p ∧ q)}, {p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}}. 
The fact that a rule satisfies agenda separability does not imply that a resolute rule
obtained by composing it with a tie-breaking mechanism satisfies agenda separability as
Agents p q p ∧ q t
J1 + + + +
J2 + - - +
J3 - + - -
P1 P2
Figure 1: Counter example to RdH ,max being agenda separable.
well. For instance, if tie-breaking favours {¬a} over {a} when A = {a}, {¬b} over {b}
when A = {b}, and {a, b} over all other judgment sets when A = {a, b}, and if P contains
one judgment set {a, b} and one judgment set {¬a,¬b}, then for any one of our rules,
and with A1 = {a,¬a} and A2 = {b,¬b}, we have R(P↓A1) = {¬a}, R(P↓A2) = {¬b},
and R(P ) = {a, b}. However, if the tie-breaking priority relation >θ satisfies the following
decomposability property, then agenda separability of an irresolute rule implies agenda
separability of its composition with θ.
A tie-breaking priority relation >θ is agenda separable if for every agenda A, for every
independent partition {A1,A2} of A, and every J1∗ , J
1
◦ ∈ JA1 , and J
2
∗ , J
2
◦ ∈ JA2 , J
1
∗ >θ J
1
◦
and J2∗ >θ J
2
◦ imply J
1
∗ ∪ J
2
∗ >θ J
1
◦ ∪ J
2
◦ .
Observation 1 If >θ is an agenda separable tie-breaking priority relation and R is agenda
separable, then Rθ is agenda separable.
Let >θ be an agenda separable tie-breaking priority relation, then raθ is agenda sepa-
rable. However, since it satisfies universal domain, unanimity principle [20], and collective
rationality, then it does not satisfy IIA. Hence, the implication stated in Proposition 1 is
strict.
Lastly, we would like to state two observations about the properties of rules that are
agenda separable.
Observation 2 Let K be a constant and say that agenda A is K-decomposable if A
can be partitioned into p syntactically unrelated agendas A1, . . . ,Ap such that for all i
|Atoms(Ai)| ≤ K. If a rule satisfies agenda separability, then the collective judgment sets
can be computed in time O(2Kn) whenever the agenda is K-decomposable.
In other terms, computing these rules is parameterized tractable when he parameter is
the degree K of decomposability, which is a complexity gap, since winner determination for
these rules is Θ2p-hard or even Π
2
p-hard [22, 13].
Moreover, agenda separability allows for a weak form of strategyproofness. Indeed, if A
can be partitioned into p syntactically unrelated agendas A1, . . . ,Ap, then no agent is able
to influence the outcome on some issue in Ai by reporting strategic judgments about issues
of Aj for j 6= i.
5 Overlapping Agenda Separability
In this section, we consider a stricter property than agenda separability. We first need the
notion of independent overlapping decomposition.
Definition 3 (Independent overlapping decomposition) Let A be an agenda and let
A = A1 ∪ A2 (but not necessarily A1 ∩ A2 = ∅). We say that {A1,A2} is an independent
overlapping decomposition (IOD) of A if and only if for every J1 ∈ JA1 , for every J
2 ∈ JA2
if J1 ∩ A2 = J
2 ∩ A1 then J
1 ∪ J2 ∈ JA.
Example 1 Let [A] = {p,¬p ∨ t, p ↔ q}, [A1] = {p,¬p ∨ t} and [A2] = {¬p ∨ t, p ↔ q}.
Note that {A1,A2} is an independent overlapping decomposition of A.
Observation 3 Every independent partition is an independent overlapping decomposition.
Example 1 shows that the contrary of the previous observation does not hold. Indeed,
as soon as the intersection of the two sub-agendas is non-empty, they do not form an
independent partition.
There is a clear connection between independent overlapping decompositions and con-
ditional independence in propositional logic [6, 19]; we do not give technical details here,
but we mention that this connection gives us several characterizations as well as complexity
results for finding independent overlapping decompositions.
We can now introduce the definition of overlapping agenda separability.
Definition 4 (Overlapping agenda separability) We say that rule R satisfies overlap-
ping agenda separability (OAS) if for every agenda A and every independent overlapping
decomposition {A1,A2} of A, for every profile P over A it holds that: if for every J1 ∈
R(P↓A1), for every J
2 ∈ R(P↓A2), we have J
1∩A2 = J2∩A1 then R(P ) = {J1∪J2 | J1 ∈
R(P↓A1) and J
2 ∈ R(P↓A2)}.
Observation 4 Overlapping agenda separability implies agenda separability.
Proof. Let {A1,A2} be an independent partition of A. From Observation 3 {A1,A2} is an
IOD. Since A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, condition J
1 ∩ A2 = J
2 ∩ A1 is satisfied for every J
1, J2. Thus,
R(P ) = {J1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ R(P↓A1) and J
2 ∈ R(P↓A2)}. 
Proposition 4 mc and ra satisfy oas.
Proof.
mc. Suppose that for every J1 ∈ mc(P1), for every J2 ∈ mc(P2), J1 ∩A2 = J2 ∩A1. Let
ΠP1,P2 = {J
1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ mc(P1) and J2 ∈ mc(P2)}.
We first show that mc(P ) ⊆ ΠP1,P2 . Let J ∈ mc(P ). Denote J
1 = J ∩ A1 and
J2 = J ∩ A2. We claim that J1 ∈ mc(P1) and J2 ∈ mc(P2). Note that J1 and J2 are
consistent. By means of contradiction, and without loss of generality, assume J1 /∈ mc(P1).
Thus, there exists J1⋆ ∈ JA1 such that J
1 ∩ m(P ) ⊂ J1⋆ ∩ m(P ). Denote J⋆ = J
1
⋆ ∪ J
2.
Observe that J⋆ is consistent. Furthermore, J ∩ m(P ) ⊂ J⋆ ∩ m(P ), thus J /∈ mc(P ),
contradiction.
We now show that ΠP1,P2 ⊆ mc(P ). Let J
1 ∈ mc(P1) and J2 ∈ mc(P2). Denote
J = J1 ∪ J2. Since {A1,A2} is an IOD, J is consistent. Suppose J /∈ mc(P ). Thus, there
exists J ′ ∈ JA such that J ∩m(P ) ⊂ J ′∩m(P ). Let ϕ ∈ (J ′∩m(P ))\ (J ∩m(P )). Without
loss of generality, assume ϕ ∈ A1. Denote J1⋆ = J
′ ∩ A1. Note that J1⋆ is consistent and
J1 ∩m(P ) ⊂ J1⋆ ∩m(P ), contradiction.
ra. We give only a proof sketch.
Suppose that for every J1 ∈ ra(P1), for every J
2 ∈ ra(P2), J
1 ∩ A2 = J
2 ∩ A1. Let
ΠP1,P2 = {J
1∪J2 | J1 ∈ ra(P1) and J2 ∈ ra(P2)}. Let J1 ∈ ra(P1), J2 ∈ ra(P2). Denote
J = J1 ∪ J2. We claim that J ∈ ra(P ). Because J1 ∈ ra(P1), there is an order >σ1 on
A1, refining %P1 such that J
1 = Jσ1 . Similarly, there is an order >σ2 on A2, refining %P2 ,
such that J2 = Jσ2 . We first claim that without loss of generality, we can assume that >σ1
and >σ2 coincide on A1 ∩A2. For this we construct σ
′′ on A2, refining %P2 , such that >σ′′
coincides with >σ1 on A1 ∩ A2 and Jσ′′ = Jσ2 = J
2.
Now, let >σ be an order on A refining %P and extending both >σ1 and >σ2 . Let
A = {α1, . . . , α2m}. Without loss of generality, suppose α1 >σ . . . >σ α2m. Let Si ⊆ A be
the set obtained at the step i of construction of J = Jσ. We show by induction on i that
(Hi) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , i} we have αj ∈ Si iff αj ∈ J
1 ∪ J2.
From (H2m), we obtain J = J
1 ∪ J2.
We now show that ra(P ) ⊆ ΠP1,P2 . Suppose J ∈ ra(P ). Let >σ be an order on A such
that J = Jσ. Without loss of generality, suppose α1 >σ . . . >σ α2m. Denote by >σ1 (resp.
>σ2) the restriction of >σ on A1 (resp. A2). Let J
1 = Jσ1 and J
2 = Jσ2 . Observe that
J1 ∩ A2 = J2 ∩ A1. Since {A1,A2} is an IOD, J1 ∪ J2 is consistent.
Let Si ⊆ A be the set obtained at the step i of construction of J = Jσ. We show by
induction on i that
(Hi) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , i} we have αj ∈ Si iff αj ∈ J
1 ∪ J2.
By putting i = 2m, we obtain J = J1 ∪ J2. 
Proposition 5 mcc, med, fullH , and Rrev do not satisfy oas.
Proof.
mcc, med and fullH . We now provide a counter-example to show that mcc and
med do not satisfy oas. Let [A1] = {p, p → q, p → r, q, r}, [A2] = {q, r, s, s → q, s → r},
and A = A1∪A2. Observe that {A1,A2} is an IOD ofA. Consider the profile from Figure 2.
p p→ q p→ r q r s s→ q s→ r
J1 + + + + + + + +
J2 - + + - - - + +
J3 + - - - - + - -
Figure 2: The counter example used to show that several rules do not satisfy oas.
We obtain mcc(P1) = med(P1) = fullH(P1) =
{
{ ¬p, p→ q, p→ r, ¬q, ¬r, }
}
,
and mcc(P2) = med(P2) = fullH(P2) =
{
{ ¬s, s→ q, s→ r, ¬q, ¬r, }
}
.
However, mcc(P ) = med(P ) = fullH(P ) = {{¬p, p → q, p → r,¬q,¬r,¬s, s → q, s → r},
{p, p→ q, p→ r, q, r, s, s→ q, s→ r}}.
Rrev. The proof is omitted due to space limitations. 
The preference agenda [9] associated with a set of alternatives C = {x1, . . . , xq} is
AC = {xiPxj | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q}. When j > i, xiPxj is not a proposition of AC , but we write
xjPxi as a shorthand for ¬(xjPxi). Conversely, given a judgment set J on AC , the binary
relation ≻J over C is defined by: for all xi, xj ∈ C, xi ≻J xj if xiPxj ∈ J and xj ≻J xi if
¬xiPxj ∈ J .
Observation 5 For any m ≥ 3, there exists no (non-trivial) independent overlapping de-
composition of the preference agenda over the set of alternatives C = {x1, . . . , xm}.
Proof. We first establish the following lemma: if {A1,A2} is an independent overlapping
decomposition, then for all xi, xj , xk, xiPxj and xiPxk are both in A1 or both in A2.
Assume that it is not the case: without loss of generality, xiPxj ∈ A1 and xiPxk ∈ A2.
Also without loss of generality, assume xjPxk ∈ A1. Let J1 and J2 be two consistent
judgment sets over A1 and A2 such that J1 contains {xiPxj , xjPxk}, J2 contains xkPxi,
and J1 and J2 are completed in an arbitrary way such that J1 ∩A2 = J2 ∩A1; J1 ∪J2 is an
inconsistent judgment set over A1 ∪A2, which contradicts the assumption that {A1,A2} is
an independent overlapping decomposition.
Assume without loss of generality that x1Px2 ∈ A1. Let x′, x′′ ∈ {x1, . . . , xk}. If
x′ = x1 or x
′′ = x1 then the above lemma implies that x
′Px′′ ∈ A1. If neither x′ = x1 nor
x′′ = x1, then the above lemma implies that x1Px
′ ∈ A1, and applying the lemma again
leads to x′Px′′ ∈ A1. This being true for all x′, x′′, we have A1 = A, and {A1,A2} is a
trivial decomposition. 
6 Discussion
We proposed a new property for judgment aggregation, namely agenda separability. It is
a relaxation of the classical independence property, and unlike it, it is satisfied by several
non-degenerate judgment aggregation rules. We have defined a stronger version of agenda
separability, namely overlapping agenda separability, which is even more discriminant, since
we have identified only two of the previously studied judgment aggregation rules that satisfy
it, namely mc and ra. Note that ra satisfied furthermore unanimity principle [20]. Also,
two rules were left out of this paper due to space limitations: the judgment aggregation
version of the Young rule, which does not satisfy agenda separability, and the ‘geodesic’
distance-base rule of Duddy and Piggins [11], which satisfies agenda separability but not
overlapping agenda separability.
A possible reason why agenda separability has not been studied sooner is that it is not
applicable to common agendas such as the preference agenda, simply because they are not
decomposable (cf. Observation 5). A similar observation would hold for other agendas of
interest, such as those used for the aggregation of equivalence relations or for committee
elections. However, agenda separability does apply to variants of these problems. Suppose
for instance that we have to elect a committee made of K men and K women; then agenda
separability applies and says that the election of the K men and the K women do not
interfere.
This notion of agenda separability should not be confused with a notion of separability,
also known as consistency or reinforcement, considered in voting theory [31] and generalized
to judgment aggregation [20]: these notions say that if a profile P can be decomposed into
two subprofiles P1 and P2 for which the output is the same, then this should also be the
output for P .
An ambitious issue for further work would be characterizing the set of rules that satisfy
agenda separability, or one of its variants.
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